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THERE AND BACK, NOW AND THEN: IIRIRA’S
RETROACTIVITY AND THE NORMALIZATION
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Austen Ishii*
The U.S. Supreme Court has a long tradition of treating immigration law
as “exceptional,” deferring to Congress and executive agencies when
determining the scope of various immigration laws. The Court’s refusal to
subject immigration statutes to the ordinary level of judicial review has left
immigrants even more susceptible to the effects of anti-immigrant
legislation.
When the Court decided Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales in 2006 it
increased the scope of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) by allowing portions of the statute to be
applied to immigrants who had reentered the United States prior to its
effective date. At first glance Fernandez-Vargas might appear to be just
another example of the Court’s deference to the anti-immigrant policies of
the legislature that created IIRIRA and the agencies that enforce it.
However, a closer look at Fernandez-Vargas and the Court’s related
decisions on IIRIRA’s scope reveals that the Court is using ordinary tools
of statutory interpretation to determine the outer bounds of that statute’s
reach, reflecting a broader trend of more normalized treatment of
immigration law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Humberto Fernandez-Vargas illegally entered the United States
from Mexico.1 This was not his first time crossing the border; he had been
deported in 1970 and again in 1981, but he had no criminal record aside
from his immigration violations.2 After reentering the country a second
time in 1982, Fernandez-Vargas stayed in the United States for over twenty
years. He started a trucking business, had a son in 1989, and then married
the mother of his child, herself a U.S. citizen, in 2001.3 His wife filed a
relative visa petition on his behalf and then an application to adjust his legal
status.4 The couple paid a fine of $1000 for Fernandez-Vargas’s illegal
entry, and hoped that their application would be granted so that he could
become a lawful permanent resident.5
Unfortunately for Fernandez-Vargas, his adjustment application only
notified the government of his illegal reentry into the country two decades
earlier.6 In the twenty years that Fernandez-Vargas had been living in the
United States, immigration law had changed drastically. In 1996, Congress,
reacting to a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),7 a bill
containing numerous provisions restricting or eliminating numerous forms
of immigration relief. Among IIRIRA’s provisions was a change in the
immigration consequences of illegal reentry. Under IIRIRA, Fernandez1. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 (2006).
2. Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 7, Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. 30 (No. 03-9610),
2004 WL 5293897, at *5 [hereinafter Fernandez-Vargas Brief].
3. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35.
4. Id.
5. Fernandez-Vargas Brief, supra note 2, at *3.
6. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35.
7. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8,
18 U.S.C.).
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Vargas’s deportation order from 1981 would be automatically reinstated
without review, meaning that he was ineligible for the marriage-based
immigration benefit he had applied for.8 When Fernandez-Vargas showed
up for the interview in connection with his adjustment of status application,
he was arrested and taken into custody by the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.9
Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review his
reinstatement order, challenging it on the grounds that he should not be
bound by a change in law that occurred after he had made the choice to
reenter the country.10
Fernandez-Vargas was not alone in his challenge. Many other aliens
found themselves in his exact situation: having been deported at some prior
date, they had reentered the country, stayed, and built lives in the United
States only to have their status discovered many years later after the laws
had changed, automatically reinstating their former deportation orders and
denying them the chance for a review that might take account of the lives
that they had built since then.
Challenges to IIRIRA’s application worked their way up through ten of
the U.S. circuit courts.11 The appellate decisions emerged divided: eight
circuits held that IIRIRA’s changes could apply to the immigrants who
entered before the law went into effect, but two circuits disagreed.12 And
so in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court took up Fernandez-Vargas’s case to
settle the issue.13 In the end, the Court decided that the changes brought
about by IIRIRA would apply to Fernandez-Vargas (and other similarly
situated immigrants).14
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales15 remains among the Court’s most
important decisions addressing the retroactivity of IIRIRA. In FernandezVargas, the Court interpreted IIRIRA to operate retroactively in applying
the sections of the law that provide for automatic reinstatement of removal
orders of aliens who had been previously deported and then reentered the
United States prior to the law’s effective date.16
However, in the wake of that ruling, the circuit courts have held that the
same provision of IIRIRA may not be retroactively applied to aliens who
reentered the United States but applied for an adjustment of status prior to
the law going into effect.17 This results in a somewhat striking outcome:
two otherwise identically situated groups of immigrants who entered the
country before IIRIRA went into effect are given differing outcomes based
solely on whether and when they applied for an adjustment of status.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012).
Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 883 (2005).
Id. at 844.
Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 36 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
548 U.S. 30 (2006).
Id. at 38.
See infra Part IV.D–E.
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Why should the retroactivity of a law like IIRIRA turn on so thin a reed
as to when the alien applies for a benefit? Should the constitutionality of a
statute rise or fall on such random circumstances? Put differently, is there a
way of explaining the difference in outcomes seen in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fernandez-Vargas and the lower courts’ rulings? The answer
may lie in a subtler set of questions about the scope of judicial review in
immigration—a matter that appears to be developing slowly and
incrementally.
This Note examines the tradition of deferential review in immigration
law, as well as the Court’s more recent analysis of cases centered on
IIRIRA’s provisions limiting judicial review, in an attempt to place
Fernandez-Vargas and the related circuit decisions on IIRIRA’s
retroactivity in greater context. It concludes that despite their divergent
results, the cases examining IIRIRA’s retroactivity are illustrative of a
greater trend away from the historical treatment of immigration law as an
area reserved for the political branches and toward a more rigorous review
of immigration laws using ordinary tools of statutory interpretation.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the history of IIRIRA
and details some of the changes it implemented, specifically those dealt
with in the Fernandez-Vargas line of cases. Next, Part II describes the
tradition of deferential review in immigration law and looks at some areas
in which immigration-related legislation and administrative rules continue
to receive more deferential review than expected. Part III reviews the
Court’s reactions to IIRIRA and finds that the Court has repeatedly
reviewed IIRIRA in an ordinary, nondeferential manner. Part IV turns to
the analysis of IIRIRA’s retroactivity, examining Fernandez-Vargas and
the related circuit cases that deal with IIRIRA’s temporal scope. Finally,
Part V concludes that despite their differing outcomes, the line of cases
examining IIRIRA’s retroactivity are consistent with a broader trend in
which immigration law has shifted from being an exceptional area of law
subject to only passing review, to one that courts now subject to more
normalized appraisal, using the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation.
I. IIRIRA: A HARSHER IMMIGRATION REGIME
Understanding Fernandez-Vargas and its progeny requires some
background on IIRIRA itself. Part I begins by providing a brief review of
the events that led to the passage of IIRIRA. It then examines some of the
changes that the law implemented, specifically those that were the subject
of Fernandez-Vargas and the related lower court cases.
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act18 (INA),
which covered immigration quotas; entry, exclusion, and deportation
proceedings; visa issuance and inspection; and the legal relief available to
those facing deportation.19 Although it has been continually amended for
18. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.).
19. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 1:2 (2014).
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the past sixty years, the statute continues to serve as the basic framework
for current U.S. immigration law.20
The most significant and expansive changes to the INA occurred in the
mid-1990s.21 In 1994, the Republican Party gained majorities in both the
House and Senate, and within two years Congress passed an omnibus bill
that drastically altered the existing legal landscape in immigration law.22
IIRIRA was signed into law in 1996.23
The law was prompted by a number of different concerns that are
reflected in the changes that it made to the INA. An increase in antiimmigrant sentiment in the early 1990s following the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing precipitated calls
for systemic immigration reform (despite the fact that the perpetrators of the
Oklahoma City bombing turned out to be U.S. citizens).24 IIRIRA was also
motivated in part by frustration over perceived frivolous litigation filed by
immigrants who sought to use applications for judicial review as a tactic to
stall for time in otherwise groundless cases.25 Additionally, the legislative
history of the statute indicates that at least some members of Congress
believed that judges were improperly overturning agency decisions on
technicalities simply because they found an immigrant’s story to be
compelling.26
Animated by these concerns, Congress amended the INA in two
significant ways: it (1) substantially cut back on the availability of judicial
review of immigration agency rulings and (2) eliminated many forms of
20. Id.
21. See Brent Asseff, Reinstatement of Removal and IIRIRA Retroactivity After
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales: Restoring Section 212(c) Discretion and Fairness to
Immigration Law, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 157, 158 (2007).
22. See Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside
Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 349 (2005).
23. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8,
18 U.S.C.). Congress enacted another law in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), which also had substantial consequences for immigration law but
which falls outside the scope of this Note. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
24. Asseff, supra note 21, at 158; see also Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten:
How Section 212(c) Relief Continues to Divide Courts Presiding over Indictments for Illegal
Reentry, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809, 2821 n.98 (2006) (“There has long been a negative
sentiment toward immigrants based on the belief that they are responsible for social
problems . . . [such] resentment escalated when it was revealed that illegal aliens were
responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, which killed
six people and injured more than 1000 others. After the bombing of Oklahoma City on April
19, 1995, anti-immigration sentiment reached a new peak though it was later revealed that
two U.S. citizens were responsible for the attack.” (quoting Yen H. Trinh, The Impact of
New Policies Adopted After September 11 on Lawful Permanent Residents Facing
Deportation Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA and the Hope of Relief Under the Family
Reunification Act, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 543, 545 (2005)).
25. David A. Martin, Behind the Scenes on a Different Set: What Congress Needs to Do
in the Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 320–24 (2002).
26. Id. at 329 (“[S]ome staff and members of Congress considered that overly
sympathetic judges were misusing review in this realm to flyspeck opinions by the Board or
the immigration judge, identify minute errors, remand the case, and thereby block the
removal of aliens that the administrative authorities had found to be poor candidates for a
favorable exercise of discretion, but for whom the judge harbored sympathy.”).
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relief that had been available to aliens facing exclusion and deportation
orders.27
Prior to IIRIRA, federal courts had exercised the majority of their power
in immigration law through the review of decisions by the administrative
immigration agencies such as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).28
Section 106 of the INA provided for judicial review of final orders of
deportation or exclusion issued by the BIA,29 and an alien’s case was
automatically stayed pending the completion of that review.30 Additionally,
district courts were able to review a broad range of other non-deportationrelated matters, including petitions for visas, protected status, and labor
certifications.31 Courts were also able to review a limited set of
immigration orders through habeas review.32
However, IIRIRA sharply limited judicial review of discretionary
determinations made by the BIA, precluding courts from reviewing
decisions on “applications for adjustment of status, voluntary departure,
nonimmigrant visa petitions, and waivers of inadmissibility.”33
This meant that among other things, IIRIRA had the effect of tightening
restrictions on aliens because immigration agencies now often had the final
word on their cases. Most relevant to the discussion below, IIRIRA also
enlarged the class of aliens whose old deportation orders could be
automatically reinstated if they were found to have illegally reentered the
country, and it limited the possible relief available to immigrants to combat
their resurrected removal orders.34

27. Id. at 314 (“Congress sought to cut back on judicial review in three different and
sometimes overlapping ways: (1) by person, (2) by issue, and (3) by timing—that is,
consolidating issues for unified and streamlined review.”).
28. Until 2002, the INS was the primary agency in charge of administering and
enforcing immigration law. After it was abolished, its functions were transferred to a variety
of different agencies, the majority of which are housed under the Department of Homeland
Security. STEEL, supra note 19, § 1:3. Immigration law is now administered by numerous
different agencies that often have concurrent and overlapping powers. See id. §§ 2:1–:21.
29. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND DEFENSE § 10:22, at 1 (2013).
30. See Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003).
31. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 29, § 10:21
(“The district court can review final agency orders such as the denial of visa petitions, INS’
failure to process an adjustment of status application based on selection in the Diversity Visa
lottery, registry, waivers, change of nonimmigrant status, denial of extension of temporary
stay, denial of an application for temporary protected status, denial of a stay of deportation,
denial of labor certifications, DHS’ invalidation of an approved labor certification due to
alleged fraud, denial of deferred action status, denial of petition for remission or mitigation
of vehicle forfeiture, denial of adjustment of status by the district director, revocation of an
approved immigrant visa petition, determinations that an employment-based immigrant visa
petition is not portable under INA § 204(j) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(j)], determinations that a
labor certification was not ‘approvable when filed’ within the meaning of INA § 245(i) [8
U.S.C.A. § 1255(i)], denial of I-730 derivative asylum petitions, revocation of advance
parole, and denial of release on parole.” (alteration in original)).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
33. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 29, § 10:21.
34. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 33 (2006).
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Under the old law (section 212(c) of the INA), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) could only reinstate the previous deportation
or exclusion orders of illegal reentrants who had been deported on specific
grounds,35 and those reentrants were permitted to seek review and
discretionary relief with the Attorney General.36 After IIRIRA, the
government could reinstate the order of any illegal reentrant and the
opportunity to seek review was eliminated. Section 241(a)(5) of the INA
now reads:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States
illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under
an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its
original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is
not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the
alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the
reentry.37

It came as no surprise that aliens who illegally reentered the United
States after IIRIRA had a much harder time staying in the country.
However, IIRIRA’s changes also had the effect of fundamentally altering
the judiciary’s role in immigration law. The automatic reinstatement of
prior administrative decisions, and the myriad of provisions which
restricted judicial review of agency decisions, drastically limited courts’
role in immigration law. As far as Congress was concerned, the courts no
longer needed to concern themselves with reviewing BIA actions like
reinstated removal orders; such forceful and life-altering rulings now would
be automatic and final.38 A year after the law was passed, one commentator
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (1994) (repealed 1996) (noting that aliens who had been
deported for person smuggling, on national security grounds or certain criminal violations,
for failing to register, or the falsification of documents were eligible for reinstatement).
36. Asseff, supra note 21, at 160–61 n.23. In pertinent part, section 212(c) provided:
Should the Attorney General find that any alien has unlawfully reentered the
United States after having previously departed or been deported pursuant to an
order of deportation, whether before or after June 27, 1952, on any ground
described in any of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (e) of this section, the
previous order of deportation shall be deemed to be reinstated from its original
date and such alien shall be deported under such previous order at any time
subsequent to reentry.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1994) (repealed 1996); see also Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d
858, 862 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that before IIRIRA, reinstatement of removal was a “littleused” provision, which “did not apply to aliens . . . who were deported for entering the
country without inspection”).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012). For simplicity, the remainder of this Note will often
refer to section 241(a)(5) or section 1231(a)(5) of IIRIRA, though in fact IIRIRA merely
amended these sections of the INA.
38. For a pointed critique of the consequences of IIRIRA, see Brooke Hardin,
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales: An Examination of Retroactivity and the Effect of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 291, 297–98 (2007) (“IIRIRA rests the power of an alien’s continued tenure in
the United States in the hand of just one immigration official. This lone official may and
‘shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review.’
Not only is the decision given to only one immigration official, these expedited deportation
orders are neither administratively nor judicially reviewable. Thus, an alien forcing
deportation has no recourse, no matter how grave the consequences may be . . . . Obviously,
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wrote: “If judicial review of administrative orders depriving noncitizens of
the opportunity to live in the United States is an essential part of the rule of
law, then 1996 may well become known as the year in which the rule of
immigration law died.”39
This illegal reentry provision was one of the many changes wrought by
IIRIRA affecting how immigrants’ cases would be processed and
adjudicated by the mixture of immigration agencies and the federal courts.
While these changes appeared unabashedly severe, their ultimate impact
turned out to depend in many ways on how the federal courts—including
the Supreme Court—would chose to interpret their scope. Ordinarily,
judicial deference likely might be assumed. After all, the Supreme Court
has a long history of judicial restraint where “exceptional” areas such as
immigration and national security are concerned.40 The Court very well
could have been expected to defer to Congress and the immigration
agencies, which sought expansive readings of IIRIRA. But this did not
always happen. At times, the courts have interpreted IIRIRA narrowly,
preserving judicial review for some small, yet important, classes of
immigrants. Before turning to the Court’s interpretive stance toward
IIRIRA and its scope, it is thus useful to examine how the Court has
traditionally reviewed immigration laws. To that end, Part II examines the
Court’s traditional deference to the political branches on immigration
issues.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW: A HISTORY OF DEFERENCE
Traditionally, immigration law has been treated by the Court as an
exceptional area of law subject to only the most limited review, and
commentators have long derided the Court’s passive role in the field.41
Citing the doctrine of plenary power, the low level of equal protection
review afforded to statutes that target aliens, and the tendency of the Court
to defer to immigration agencies without first conducting a comprehensive
analysis of statutes, critics have argued that the Court’s passivity has led to
less protection for immigrants than would otherwise be expected, due to the
weakening of doctrines that are leveraged more strongly in other areas of
the law.42

though, under IIRIRA, Congress decided that only very limited due process is required to
fulfill this Constitutional requirement for deportable aliens.” (quoting Immigration and
Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).
39. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 704 (1997).
40. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392–94 (1999); Rachel E.
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 1965, 1981–89 (2013).
41. See generally Kanstroom, supra note 39; Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?:
The Supreme Court’s Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2012).
42. See infra Part II.A–C.
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A. Plenary Power
A plain reading of the Constitution finds the congressional power to
regulate immigration rooted in Article I, Section 8’s authority to “establish
a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”43 However, such authority was
expanded dramatically in 1889 when the Court decided Chae Chan Ping v.
United States,44 holding for the first time that Congress has what is now
known as “plenary power” to regulate immigration (though that phrase
never appears in the case).45
In Chae Chan Ping, the Court held that in addition to its constitutional
foundation, congressional power to regulate immigration stems from the
more fundamental ideas of state sovereignty and a nation’s need to protect
itself.46 More importantly, the Court also suggested that when Congress
exercises its power over immigration, its decisions should not be subject to
judicial review.47
Of course, the Court did continue to confront immigration cases, but the
effect of the plenary power doctrine has meant that, historically, courts have
generally given Congress almost complete deference when reviewing
federal statutes.48
Starting in the 1970s, the Court began to conduct limited judicial review
in some immigration cases; however, courts continued to give Congress
broad deference under the plenary power doctrine.49 In modern cases,
while the influence of the plenary power doctrine appears to have lessened,
the Court has continually declined to explicitly outline its scope when
reviewing statutes.50 Nevertheless, the Court has been unable to escape the
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
44. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
45. Id. at 606 (announcing Congress’s broad authority to bar a foreign national’s entry
when “the public interests require such exclusion”).
46. Id. at 604 (“Any restriction upon [congressional power to exclude aliens], deriving
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of
the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which
could impose such restriction.” (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (alteration in original)).
47. Id. at 606 (“[If Congress] considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security . . . its
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”).
48. Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration
and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616–17 (2000) (“[W]hen someone challenges
the constitutionality of an immigration statute, the courts accord Congress unusually great
deference, at or approaching nonreviewability.”); see also, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa
Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932) (“Under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, control of the admission of aliens is committed exclusively to
Congress . . . .”); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)
(“[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over [the admission of aliens].”).
49. Jessica Portmess, Until the Plenary Power Do Us Part: Judicial Scrutiny of the
Defense of Marriage Act in Immigration After Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1825, 1834
(2012).
50. Id. at 1839; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A
Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional
Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000).
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doctrine altogether and typically still only applies “diluted constitutional
standards to immigration cases.”51 The powerful precedent of the plenary
power doctrine ensures that Congress continues to enjoy substantial
deference in the area of immigration in a manner that is not seen in other
areas of constitutional law.52
B. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of the
most important sources of judicial protection of individual rights that might
otherwise be infringed on by the political branches.53 It is also an area
where the Court has explicitly set up a system of different levels of
deference to be used depending on the group that is being affected by
legislation.54
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”55 The same
restriction is applied to federal laws through the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment,56 but, perhaps because the courts have held that the
Constitution gives Congress plenary power over immigration, federal
immigration legislation is usually only subject to a very deferential level of
judicial review even when considered under the equal protection
framework.57
When reviewing statutes under the equal protection framework, the Court
applies three levels of scrutiny that affect how much deference is given to
the professed objectives behind the laws. The least deferential is called
strict scrutiny and is applied in situations in which the legislation at issue
discriminates based on a suspect classification or denies an individual a
fundamental right.58 Only laws that are narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest may pass strict scrutiny.59
More deferential than strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny applies when
legislation discriminates against classes that have been identified as quasisuspect and requires that the law is “substantially related to an important
governmental objective.”60
The most deferential level of scrutiny is rational basis, which applies to
any law that is not subject to the other heightened levels of scrutiny.61 To
51. Portmess, supra note 49, at 1839.
52. Legomsky, supra note 48, at 1631–32.
53. Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status As a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?: The Equal
Protection Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2008).
54. Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 801, 822–23 (2013).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
57. See Justin Hess, Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and the Supremacy Clause, 2010
B.Y.U. L. REV. 2277, 2289–90.
58. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1116 (2013).
59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
60. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
61. 16B C.J.S., supra note 58, Constitutional Law § 1120.
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pass muster under rational basis, a law need only be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.62
While the frameworks for equal protection review might seem
straightforward, their application in the immigration context has been
anything but. In the words of one commentator, “At the intersection of
immigration and equal protection lies a judicial vortex. This area of law is
a twilight zone of sorts, where established constitutional principles do not
follow their regular paths.”63
Notably, the equal protection framework generally intersects not with
immigration law itself (the rules governing the entry, expulsion, and
detention of noncitizens) but rather with the related but distinguishable area
of constitutional alienage law (alienage-based classifications affecting the
rights and obligations of noncitizens). The plenary power doctrine holds far
less sway over constitutional alienage law.64 Nevertheless, the application
of the equal protection framework to alienage law is somewhat muddled
and often finds immigrants receiving more deferential levels of review in
spite of the vulnerabilities that accompany their status.65
Early on, the Court held outside the immigration context that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects noncitizens as well as citizens from the
reach of state laws.66 However, while the Court has found that laws that
classify based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause,67 the Court has yet to define alienage with sufficient
clarity and has generally only applied strict scrutiny where alienage laws
are challenged by immigrants who are permanent residents.68
The Court has also carved out exceptions to the application of strict
scrutiny to alienage laws that discriminate against aliens who are permanent
residents. For example, permanent residents may be excluded from holding

62. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982).
63. Hess, supra note 57, at 2277.
64. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 565 (1990).
65. See id. at 574 n.155 (“Of the examples . . . of groups—‘discrete and insular
minorities’—favored by statutory interpretation, only aliens in immigration law cases stand
out as unprotected by analogous judicial concern at the constitutional level.”).
66. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
67. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Alienage is among those factors which are
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a
view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For
these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by
legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Id.
68. See Hess, supra note 57, at 2278; see also LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th
Cir. 2005) (“Thus far, the Supreme Court has reviewed with strict scrutiny only state laws
affecting permanent resident aliens.”).
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positions that carry a political function so long as the restrictions meet the
deferential rational basis level of scrutiny.69
The Court has been similarly inconsistent when it comes to determining
what level of scrutiny applies to laws that discriminate against illegal
immigrants. In Plyler v. Doe,70 the Court held that illegal aliens are not a
suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny, and yet the Court seemed to
apply intermediate scrutiny, striking down a Texas law that denied illegalimmigrant children access to public schools because the law did not further
a “substantial goal of the State.”71 Both the dissent in Plyler and the Fifth
Circuit noted that while the Court professed to be applying rational basis,
they were in fact subjecting the law to closer scrutiny.72
Despite Plyler’s somewhat confusing outcome, in general the opinion
provides language that indicates that states need only justify classifications
of illegal aliens by showing that there is some rational relationship between
the classification and the interest sought to be protected by the law.73
In whole, the equal protection analysis itself provides a more in-depth
review of alienage legislation than the plenary power doctrine has for
ordinary immigration law.74 Nevertheless, a review of the cases shows that,
in general, statutes that discriminate based on alienage receive a more
deferential level of review than those that discriminate against other groups
with similar legal vulnerabilities.
The Court reviews state laws that discriminate against illegal aliens under
the relatively cursory rational basis review, and in some cases even uses
rational basis review for laws that discriminate against immigrants who
have become lawful permanent residents.75 These cases indicate that when
it comes to aliens and equal protection, the Court will generally defer to
both state and federal legislatures.
The reason for such limited review may be due to the fact that an
immigrant’s alienage status often belies the complexities of his or her
particular legal situation76 or it may be because alienage law still finds itself

69. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (“[B]ecause this country entrusts
many of its most important policy responsibilities to these officers . . . it represents the
choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen peers.”); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 476–77 (1991); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
70. 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect
class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional
irrelevancy.’”).
71. Id. at 224.
72. Hess, supra note 57, at 2284.
73. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19, 223.
74. Motomura, supra note 64, at 566 (“[The alienage equal protection cases] took . . .
constitutional claims seriously, in contrast to the cavalier treatment of constitutional claims
in immigration law.”).
75. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978).
76. Hess, supra note 57, at 2287–88 (“[Individuals] enter the United States for different
reasons, under different conditions, and under different obligations. The Supreme Court has
refused to use heightened equal protection scrutiny, (anything more than a rational basis), for
heterogeneous classes that are ‘large, diverse, and amorphous.’” (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
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in the shadow of immigration law and the plenary power law that
accompanies it.77
C. Administrative Adjudication
Commentators have also critiqued how the Court reviews administrative
decisions in the immigration context. Chief among the concerns raised is
the worry that the Court is not applying the famous Chevron78 doctrine with
the proper rigor (or alternatively, that the Court is reformulating the
doctrine) when reviewing decisions from administrative immigration
agencies.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,79 the
Court created a two-step framework for evaluating when to give force to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute. The first step requires federal courts to
determine whether a statute is ambiguous.80 Where a statute is ambiguous,
the court will defer to the agency’s construction of the statute so long as it is
reasonable, an inquiry that constitutes the second step of the test.81 “In this
manner, Chevron gave both the federal courts and agencies a role in
interpreting statutes.”82
Professor Shruti Rana argues that recent immigration jurisprudence
reveals that the Court has increasingly declined to perform its traditional
interpretive role, preferring to allow agencies to interpret statutes and then
merely assessing the agencies’ results.83 Driving this shift is agencies’
increasing invocation of the Court’s ruling in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services84 as a way to
“bypass judicial constructions contrary to the agency’s views” and “avoid
statutory interpretations the agency believes [are] unfavorable.”85
In Brand X, the Court held that where a statute is ambiguous, not only
must courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations, but agencies may
themselves actively disregard judicial constructions of statutes.86
Furthermore, Brand X requires that courts must yield to agencies’
interpretations in preference to the courts’ own precedents if the statute is
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.87 Taken broadly,
Brand X makes agencies, and not courts, the final arbiters of the law.88
77. Id. at 2279 (arguing that “[b]ecause Congress has plenary power over immigration,
courts should approach discriminatory state laws by first evaluating their constitutionality
under the Supremacy Clause”); see also Motomura, supra note 64, at 574 (“[T]he plenary
power doctrine smothers the entire field of immigration law . . . completely.”).
78. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
79. See id. at 842.
80. See id. at 843–44.
81. See id.
82. Rana, supra note 41, at 315 n.2.
83. Id. at 322.
84. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
85. Rana, supra note 41, at 347–48 (citation omitted).
86. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1017.
87. Id. at 980–81.
88. Rana, supra note 41, at 317 (“[In Brand X,] the Court came close to declaring that
‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the [agency] to say what the law is.’”
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Professor Rana examined a number of recent Supreme Court immigration
cases and concludes that the use of Brand X has reduced the courts’ role to
that of “error-checking” the reasonableness of agency action rather than
actively interpreting statutes, resulting in the collapse of Chevron’s twostep test into a single step.89
She argues that this deference is problematic not only because the Court
seems to be ceding an important role traditionally held by the judiciary, but
also because it comes at a point when the immigration agencies are
overburdened and thus most vulnerable to abusing and misusing the power
that is being deferred to them.90
Taken together, the plenary power afforded to congressional legislation
on immigration, the relatively low level of scrutiny used to review statutes
that discriminate against aliens, and the erosion of full Chevron review in
administrative immigration cases seem to solidify the notion that courts
generally have been deferential to the political branches when it comes to
immigration.
Given such a pattern, one might expect that the Court would only subject
IIRIRA to the most passing and deferential judicial review, resulting in an
expansive application of the law. However, a review of the cases in which
the Court has addressed the scope of IIRIRA, in particular its decisions on
the availability of judicial review under the statute, reveal that the Court has
continually used the tools at its disposal to limit IIRIRA’s application.91
Somewhat surprisingly, the IIRIRA cases indicate that the Court is still
willing to conduct in-depth analysis of immigration laws in some areas.
III. THE COURT’S SURPRISING REACTIONS TO IIRIRA
In the last two decades, the Court has had numerous opportunities to
interpret the scope of a number of IIRIRA’s provisions. Among other
things, the Court has: reviewed the validity of the law’s restrictions on
judicial review of removal determinations,92 determined whether an offense
was an “aggravated felony” for the purposes of the provision,93 adjudicated
(modifying the famous quote from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(alteration in original))).
89. Id. at 353.
90. Id. at 318–19. Professor Rana notes that the BIA is “buckl[ing] under a mammoth
caseload, replacing three-judge panels with single judges, commonly issuing one-line
summary affirmances of immigration judges’ decisions (decisions which are themselves
coming from a geographically and politically dispersed group of immigration judges)
without either endorsing those judges’ rationales or suggesting alternatives, and issuing
opinions that federal appellate judges across the political and jurisprudential spectrum have
found indefensible,” and similarly, that the Executive Office for Immigration Review is
“beset with so many severe problems—from overburdened courts and an enormous backlog
of cases, to charges of bias, to endemic mistakes, to widely inconsistent decision making—
‘[t]hat the American asylum system has fallen into disrepute is no longer a significantly
contested point of debate.’” Id. (citing Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New
Procedural Perspective on America’s Asylum System, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2007)).
91. See infra Part III.
92. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999).
93. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3 (2004).
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when the government can exercise discretion as to removal destination,94
determined how an alien may calculate residence to meet the temporal
requirements for eligibility for cancellation of removal,95 examined the
limits of IIRIRA’s provision for post-removal-period detention,96 reviewed
whether an alien may withdraw from a voluntary departure agreement under
the provision,97 determined whether the law barred judicial review of a
denial of an alien’s motion to reopen removal proceedings,98 examined
what standard governs stays of removal pending judicial review under the
statute,99 and ruled on whether IIRIRA bars habeas corpus review of
discretionary relief from deportation.100
IIRIRA contains a number of provisions that explicitly strip federal
courts of jurisdiction to review immigration decisions.101 Inevitably, the
Court faced several opportunities to review these provisions, and while the
Court did cede some jurisdiction where explicitly required to do so,102 it
took a very nondeferential stand when it refused to read the statute’s
provisions as stripping it of its jurisdiction over habeas review.103 In the
cases below, the Court found that broader readings of IIRIRA would lead to
conflicts with the fundamental powers and protections in the Constitution.
INS v. St. Cyr104 dealt with two primary issues: the retroactivity of
IIRIRA, which is discussed in Part IV, and whether IIRIRA’s provisions
could deprive courts of the jurisdiction to review an alien’s habeas
petitions. Using ordinary tools of interpretation, the Court retained the right
to review aliens’ habeas petitions.105
Notwithstanding the ordinary requirement to defer under the notion of
plenary powers,106 in St. Cyr the Court noted that there is a “strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action” and
therefore that repealing habeas jurisdiction requires a “clear statement of

94. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 337 (2005).
95. See generally Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
96. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
97. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 4 (2008).
98. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 236–37 (2010).
99. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423–25 (2009).
100. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 349 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 292 (2001).
101. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 29; see also
supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text.
102. Calcano-Martinez, 533 U.S. at 351; Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471, 481 (1999) (finding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over an
action in which resident aliens alleged that they had been targeted for deportation because of
their affiliation with a politically unpopular group, in violation of their constitutional rights).
103. Aliens have long been able to petition the courts for writs of habeas corpus in order
to challenge the legal basis for immigration decisions. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (holding that Immigration Act of 1891 did not deprive courts of
habeas jurisdiction); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 628 (1888) (holding that
Chinese Restriction Acts did not eliminate habeas jurisdiction).
104. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
105. Id. at 311.
106. See supra notes 42–51 and accompanying text.
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congressional intent.”107 No such plain statement was found in IIRIRA,
despite the fact that one of its previsions was titled “Elimination of Custody
Review by Habeas Corpus.”108
The Court then used a variety of tools to bolster its ruling. It invoked the
canon of construction requiring a clear indication when a statute “invokes
the outer limits of Congress’s power,” and the substantive canon of
constitutional avoidance which requires the Court to construe statutes to
avoid raising constitutional issues where an “alternative interpretation of the
statute is ‘fairly possible.’”109
The Court also considered the history of the writ of habeas corpus as a
“means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention,” as well as a
means of reviewing “an alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief” in
immigration cases.110 The Court also noted that habeas corpus proceedings
are distinct from, and far narrower than, what is termed judicial review or
jurisdiction to review, under the Administrative Procedure Act.111 As such,
although the provisions in IIRIRA limited judicial review, the Court
concluded that they could not be read to preclude habeas review in such
cases.112
Not all of the Justices were happy with the choice of interpretive tools
used in St. Cyr. In a strong dissent penned by Justice Scalia and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and in part by Justice O’Connor, the
majority opinion is criticized for failing to give force to the plain language
of the statute and instead “fabricat[ing] . . .[a] ‘magic words’ requirement
for the congressional expression” of an intent to limit habeas review.113
In Zadvydas v. Davis,114 the Court used the principles laid out in St. Cyr
to preclude a reading of IIRIRA that would have allowed for the indefinite
detention of an alien.115 In particular, the Court invoked the canon of
constitutional avoidance, eschewing a construction that would raise due
107. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (“Implications from statutory text or legislative history are
not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and
unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal.” (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (1
Wall.) 85, 105 (1869))).
108. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 401(e), 110
Stat. 1268. The Court held that “title alone is not controlling,” and found that the exact text
of the section only repealed an earlier statute that amended the judicial review sections of the
1952 version of the INA. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308–09.
109. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–300 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
The Court found that the habeas provisions in Article I, Section 9, clause 2 of the
Constitution require judicial intervention in deportation cases, and, as such, reading IIRIRA
to preclude such intervention would raise a serious constitutional issue. Id. at 300.
110. Id. at 301, 304.
111. Id. at 312.
112. Id. at 312–13; see also Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 351 (2001) (“We
agree with petitioners that leaving aliens without a forum for adjudicating claims such as
those raised in this case would raise serious constitutional questions. We also agree with
petitioners—and the Court of Appeals—that these concerns can best be alleviated by
construing the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of that statute not to preclude aliens such as
petitioners from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to § 2241.”).
113. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
115. Id. at 689.
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process concerns, by reading the statute as containing an implicit
“reasonableness” requirement.116 In doing so, the Court recognized that
rather than giving the statute its literal construction, it was instead finding
that the statute “suggests” that the Attorney General has less than unlimited
discretion.117
True to St. Cyr, four members of the Court dissented in Zadvydas
(although a different four), arguing that the majority had chosen to ignore
the plain meaning of the statute and instead manufactured “constitutional
impediment[s] to the discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General.”118
Ultimately, in deciding St. Cyr and Zadvydas, the Court chose to espouse
principles that favored aliens119 and the Court’s own constitutional
powers,120 rather than deferring to either the congressional intent embodied
in an immigration statute that is anti-immigrant and against judicial
intervention, or to the Attorney General’s office which sought a broader
interpretation of the INA and IIRIRA.121
The rationale behind substantive canons, such as the canon of
constitutional avoidance, is arguably to credit congressional intent by
assuming that Congress never intended to write a law that plainly violates
the Constitution, thereby preserving laws by reading them in a way that
does not require that they be struck down as unconstitutional.122
Nevertheless, the dissents in St. Cyr and Zadvydas suggest that instead the
Court is using the canon of constitutional avoidance so as to avoid giving
full effect to the plain meaning of IIRIRA and the decisions of the agencies
that enforce it. That the dissenting Justices are so concerned by what they
deem to be an overreach of the Court’s power123 suggests that this is one
area of immigration law in which the Court is unlikely to be accused of
being overly deferential to the political branches.

116. Id. at 690–99.
117. Id. at 689, 697.
118. Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119. See Jonathan H. Ross, A Gate Forever Closed? Retiring Immigration Law’s PostDeparture Bar, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1068 (2012) (“In recent years, three norms have
emerged that the Supreme Court has relied on in favor of immigrants: (1) the presumption
that administrative actions should be subject to judicial review, even in the immigration
context; (2) the use of a ‘clear statement rule’ to prevent congressional silence from being
transformed into a nonexistent legislative mandate; and (3) that immigrants should have
every opportunity to fight the harsh consequences of removal.”).
120. See Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753,
754 (2013) (conceptualizing habeas review as “a form of Article III power belonging to
judges, and not as some sort of right”).
121. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (majority opinion).
122. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (“The canon [of constitutional
avoidance] is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.”).
123. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In the guise of judicial
restraint the Court ought not to intrude upon the other branches.”). For a similar argument,
see Justice O’Connor’s partial concurrence in Demore v. Kim. 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003)
(O’Conner, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that the majority
incorrectly followed St. Cyr’s reasoning to disregard the plain meaning of § 1226(c) of the
INA in order to preserve habeas review).
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Even when the Court examined questions about IIRIRA’s scope that did
not involve clear constitutional conflicts allowing it to invoke the canon of
constitutional avoidance, the Court still has used other interpretational
doctrines to read the immigration statute narrowly.
In Clark v. Martinez,124 the Court revisited its decision in Zadvydas,
holding that the reasonableness requirement that it had read into the
provisions applied to inadmissible aliens in the same manner as it did to
aliens who had been admitted to the United States.125 The Court explained
its holding as the product of the simple rule that statutory text could not be
construed to have different meanings depending on the characteristics of the
aliens it was applied to, despite the fact that the “statutory purpose and
constitutional concerns influencing the Zadvydas construction are not
present for inadmissible aliens.”126 As such, the Court eschewed the
government’s interpretation of the statute in favor of its own even where
there was no need to do so to avoid a constitutional problem.
In Dada v. Mukasey,127 the Court again overruled a decision that would
have given force to the immigration agency’s interpretation of IIRIRA.128
Dada dealt with two conflicting sections of IIRIRA, “one directing
voluntary departure and the other directing termination of the motion to
reopen if an alien departs the United States.”129 A ruling by the BIA,
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, held that the result of the two provisions was
that “an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but fails to depart
in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from applying for and receiving . . .
However, the Court found this result
adjustment of status.”130
unsatisfactory.131 Finding that the language of the two provisions was
unambiguous, the Court looked instead at the practical effects they created
and the purpose behind motions to reopen.132 The Court held that
preserving “the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the
Government’s interest in the quid pro quo of the voluntary departure
arrangement” required that aliens be allowed to withdraw their requests for
voluntary departure before the expiration of the departure period.133
The dissent in Dada argued that the majority had created a remedy
without citing the authority of any statute or regulation, in order to solve a
“‘necessity’ [that] does not exist.”134 Whether or not the case was correctly
decided, the critiques of the majority’s reasoning and the case’s result in
overturning the BIA’s interpretation both suggest that the case provides
124. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
125. Id. at 385.
126. Id. at 380.
127. 554 U.S. 1 (2008).
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 7.
131. See id. at 18 (“Absent . . . remedial action by this Court, then, the alien who is
granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable
by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis . . . .”).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 19.
134. Id. at 23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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another example of the Court’s choice not to defer to agencies’
interpretations of IIRIRA, even when such interpretations would seem to be
based on the plain meaning of the statute’s provisions.135
In Nken v. Holder,136 the Court addressed whether IIIRIRA changed
appellate courts’ ability to stay an alien’s removal pending his or her
decision.137 Although the government argued that the courts’ stay power
should fall under the provisions of IIRIRA that limited injunctive relief, the
Court held that a stay differed from an injunction and therefore remained
governed by the less restrictive traditional stay factors.138
Using textualist arguments, the Court found that if Congress had intended
the stay power to be governed by the section restricting injunctive relief, it
would have simply used the word “stay,” as it did in other sections of
IIRIRA.139 Noting that the power to stay pending judicial review is an
inherent power of federal appellate courts, the Court again invoked the plain
statement rule: “[W]e are loath to conclude that Congress would, ‘without
clearly expressing such a purpose, deprive the Court of Appeals of its
customary power to stay orders under review.’”140
Dissenting in Nken, Justice Alito argued that the majority inappropriately
used semantics to “nullif[y] an important statutory provision.”141 He
suggested that the Court did not uphold congressional intent because the
section restricting injunctive relief was, like other provisions of IIRIRA,
“aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts. Indeed,
‘protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts . . . can fairly be said
to be the theme of the legislation.’”142 Here again, the dissenting opinion
from an IIRIRA case suggests that the Court is using statutory tools to craft
its own interpretations rather than merely deferring to an agency’s
interpretation or the general scheme and spirit of the law, as characterized
by the dissent.143
In Kucana v. Holder,144 the Court again examined the scope of judicial
review available under IIRIRA.145 The Seventh Circuit had held that
amendments made to the INA by IIRIRA stripped the courts of the power to
review not only those administrative decisions made discretionary by
statute, but also those made discretionary by regulations promulgated and
adopted by the immigration agencies.146 The Supreme Court disagreed,
135. Id.
136. 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
137. Id. at 422.
138. Id. at 426.
139. Id. at 430–31.
140. Id. at 433 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)).
141. Nken, 556 U.S. at 439 (Alito, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 443 (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
486 (1999)).
143. Id. at 439.
144. 558 U.S. 233 (2010).
145. Id. at 244.
146. Id. A regulation had been amended a few months before IIRIRA went into force
which provided that the BIA (exercising authority delegated by the Attorney General) had
discretion over whether or not to grant or deny a motion to reopen. Id. at 239.
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determining that the relevant section of IIRIRA applied only to agency
determinations made discretionary by statute and not by regulation.147 The
Court based its decision on “the longstanding exercise of judicial review of
administrative rulings on reopening motions, the text and context of [the
relevant section of IIRIRA].”148 The Court also invoked a number of
interpretive doctrines including “the ‘presumption favoring interpretations
of statutes [to] . . . allow judicial review of administrative action’”149 and
“[s]eparation-of-powers concerns” which “caution [the Court] against
reading legislation, absent clear statement, to place in executive hands
authority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain.”150 Accordingly,
the decision in Kucana provides another example of the Court’s choice to
actively use a wide array of tools of statutory interpretation rather than
simply defer to the interpretation of an executive agency.
IV. THE RETROACTIVITY DECISIONS
Determining the retroactive reach of IIRIRA’s provisions presented the
Court with the opportunity to either expand the law’s application or to
temper and contract its anti-immigrant outcomes. Like the decisions above,
the cases on IIRIRA’s retroactivity all tended towards a more ordinary form
of statutory interpretation, rather than blind deference to the political
branches. However, before explaining the decisions themselves, it is
necessary to provide some background information on retroactivity.
Therefore, Part IV begins with a brief background of the judicial
apprehensions towards retroactive legislation, and the test the Court created
to examine a statute’s retroactive effects. Part IV then examines a series of
cases in which the Supreme Court and the circuit courts applied the test for
retroactivity to IIRIRA’s provisions.
A. The Dangers of Retroactivity
American jurisprudence has long disfavored the retroactive application of
new laws.151 This principle has roots in the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution152 and is motivated by concerns over fair notice,153 the need to

147. Id. at 237.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64 (1993)).
150. Id.
151. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41:2, at 376 (7th
ed. 2001); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“[T]he
presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and
embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.”).
152. Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002).
153. See 2 SINGER, supra note 151, § 41:2 (“There is general consensus that notice or
warning of a rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects will be judged.
The hackneyed maxim that everyone is held to know the law, itself a principle of dubious
wisdom, nevertheless presupposes that the law is at least susceptible of being known. But
this is not possible for law that has yet to exist.”).
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provide stability and predictability,154 and a desire to protect “legitimate
expectations and settled transactions.”155 Additionally, retroactive statutes
raise the specter of the use of legislation as a tool for political oppression.156
Nevertheless, Congress may enact retrospective legislation within
constitutional limits.157 To ensure that ex post facto legislation is properly
limited, statutes are only given retroactive effect when it is unequivocally
clear that Congress intended them to have such effect.158 While requiring a
clear mandate of retroactivity creates a strict standard for legislators,159 it
ensures that retrospective legislation is only created deliberately, hopefully
after consideration of the potentially unfair consequences of such
legislation.160 These considerations are captured in the leading Supreme
Court treatment of the retroactivity of statutes, Landgraf v. USI Film
Products.161
B. The Landgraf Test
In 1994, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for the
analysis of retrospective legislation in Landgraf.162 The first prong of the
test incorporates the general rule that statutes must contain legislative
authorization of retroactivity to be given retrospective effect: “[T]he
court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed
the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no
need to resort to judicial default rules.”163 Accordingly, the first prong
recognizes that Congress may have legitimate reasons for enacting

154. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265–66 (“In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both
commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence
about the legal consequences of their actions.”).
155. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McKeithen, 226 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“Retroactive legislation, as opposed to the prospective kind, can present more severe
problems of unfairness because it can upset legitimate expectations and settled
transactions.”).
156. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (“The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep
away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration.
Its
responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive
legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.”).
157. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001).
158. United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926) (“That a statute
shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language
or by necessary implication is a rule of general application.”).
159. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 & n.4 (1997) (“[C]ases where this Court has
found truly ‘retroactive’ effect adequately authorized by a statute have involved statutory
language that was so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.”); Arevalo v.
Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[A]s a general rule, the benchmark for finding
unambiguous temporal scope is quite high.”).
160. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272–73 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself
has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and
determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”).
161. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
162. Id. at 280.
163. Id.
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retroactive provisions but mitigates the unfairness of retroactivity by
requiring Congress to be clear about its intentions.164
The second prong of the Landgraf test recognizes that statutes may still
have damaging retroactive effects even when Congress has not delineated
their reach. The second prong therefore prescribes a standard for
determining when such effects justify limiting the statute’s application.165
To craft the standard, the Court pulled language from an opinion written
in 1814 by Justice Story, sitting on the circuit court in the District of New
Hampshire.166 Justice Story found that there were two categories of statutes
that had retroactive effects: those that “take[] away or impair[] vested
rights acquired under existing laws,” and those that “create[] a new
obligation, impose[] a new duty, or attach[] a new disability, in respect to
transactions or considerations already past.”167 While the distinction
between these categories is somewhat vague,168 Justice Story made clear
that courts should examine both the change in the law itself, and the
relationship between the operation of that change and “a relevant past
event.”169
In adopting Justice Story’s categories, the Court noted that any test it
imposed was unlikely to provide perfect guidance on when a statute has
impermissible retroactive effects.170 However, the Court felt that “familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations,”
as well as judges’ “sound . . . instinct[s]” in the area of retroactivity would
provide them with the supplemental guidance they needed to reach a fair
result.171
C. Retroactivity and Immigration in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court confronted the retroactivity of IIRIRA for the first
time in INS v. St. Cyr.172 The case raised an important question of whether
aliens should face post-hoc consequences imposed by IIRIRA for things
they had done prior to its enactment.173
St. Cyr dealt with a significant provision of the INA that removed the
opportunity to apply for discretionary relief that, prior to IIRIRA, was
generally available to immigrants facing deportation. In the case, Enrico St.
Cyr took a plea agreement and pled guilty to selling a controlled
substance.174 Under the laws existing prior to IIRIRA, St. Cyr would have
been able to apply for a discretionary waiver of his deportation under
164. Id. at 268.
165. Id. at 280.
166. Id. at 268.
167. Id. at 269.
168. This ambiguity has arguably allowed courts more flexibility in finding that a statute
has retroactive effects, thereby circumscribing its scope. See infra Part IV.D–E.
169. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270.
170. Id. at 276.
171. Id. at 270 (citing Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (Mass. 1901)).
172. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
173. Id. at 293.
174. Id.
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section 212(c) of the INA.175 However, IIRIRA amended another section
of the INA, 304(b), narrowing the class of individuals eligible for section
212(c) waivers.176 The newly amended section excluded anyone convicted
of any aggravated felony,177 and if applied to St. Cyr, it would have denied
him the opportunity to apply for such relief.
The Court looked to the test established in Landgraf and held that, per
the first prong, Congress had not commanded with “requisite clarity” that
IIRIRA should be applied retroactively.178 In doing so, the Court
emphasized that the standard in Landgraf’s first prong is a demanding one
and that retroactive effect authorized by statute must “involve[] statutory
language that [i]s so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.”179
The Court then rejected arguments that IIRIRA’s comprehensiveness,
date of enactment, or savings clause indicated Congress’s intentions that it
be retroactive.180 The Court also found that Congress had explicitly
indicated that other sections of IIRIRA were to apply retroactively, so its
failure to do so with regard to section 304(b) rendered the legislature’s
intent ambiguous at best.181 Accordingly, it found that Congress had not
clearly indicated that the section was to be retroactively applied.182
Turning to the second prong of the Landgraf test, the Court looked to
Justice Story’s categories of retroactivity and found that section 304(b) fell
under the second category: “IIRIRA’s elimination of any possibility of . . .
relief for people who entered into plea agreements with the expectation that
they would be eligible for such relief clearly ‘attaches a new disability, in
respect to transactions or considerations already past.’”183
In an effort to follow “Landgraf’s common-sense, functional retroactivity
analysis,”184 the Court was diligent in examining the precise nature of the
past transaction in question and the expectations of relief that may have
accompanied it. The Court emphasized criminal defendants’ knowledge
and consideration of the “immigration consequences of their convictions”
when considering plea deals, citing state laws that require trial judges to
explain such consequences when discussing plea deals,185 statistics on the
frequency that immigration relief was granted prior to IIRIRA’s

175. Id. at 295.
176. Id. at 314.
177. Id. at 297.
178. Id. at 316.
179. Id. at 317 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997)).
180. Id. at 317.
181. Id. at 318–19.
182. Id. at 320 (“The presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory
provisions, buttressed by ‘the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities
in deportation statutes in favor of the alien,’ forecloses the conclusion that, in enacting
§ 304(b), ‘Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive
application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing
benefits.’” (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272–73 (1994))).
183. Id. at 321 (citations omitted) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269).
184. Id. at 324.
185. Id. at 322 n.48.
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enactment,186 as well as individual cases in which defendants negotiated
deals in return for immigration relief.187 In light of these factors the Court
was convinced that denying defendants a form of relief that they had
effectively bargained for by taking a plea deal equated to the impermissible
attachment of a new consequence for a past action.188 Therefore, the Court
determined that section 304(b) was impermissibly retroactive.189
The result of the decision was to restrain IIRIRA’s scope, despite the
government’s arguments that the statute should be applied. Although the
decision was limited to only one of IIRIRA’s provisions, its impact was
profound because it preserved an important and oft-used form of relief for
those whose actions took place before IIRIRA was enacted. Between 1989
and 1996, 51.5 percent of all applications for 212(c) relief were granted,
and over 10,000 immigrants received some kind of waiver grant during that
period.190 While IIRIRA did away with 212(c) relief, St. Cyr preserved that
avenue for those who had acted before the statute became effective.
St. Cyr guided the circuit courts that began to hear challenges to the
retroactive application of other provisions of IIRIRA. However, each
section of the INA that was changed by IIRIRA still required an
independent assessment under Landgraf, and while St. Cyr provided clues
about how to apply the test, it did not dictate a result in other cases on the
statute’s retroactive reach. When the circuit courts considered the temporal
scope of the illegal reentry provision under section 241(a)(5), a split quickly
developed as the courts used Landgraf to differing results. This split was
the subject of the Court’s next big IIRIRA decision, Fernandez-Vargas v.
Gonzales.
In Fernandez-Vargas, the Court again looked to the Landgraf test, but
unlike in St. Cyr, the result of the case was to expand the reach of IIRIRA
rather than to limit it. Humberto Fernandez-Vargas was a Mexican citizen
who had first entered the United States in the 1970s.191 He was
subsequently deported, but he continued to reenter the country illegally on
multiple occasions, with his last illegal entry taking place in 1982.192
Thereafter, Fernandez-Vargas started a business, had a son in 1989, and
married his wife in 2001.193 His wife filed a relative visa petition on his
behalf, and he then filed for an adjustment of status in order to become a
lawful permanent resident.194 Unfortunately, his application notified the
government that Fernandez-Vargas was in the country illegally, and
immigration officials moved to reinstate his prior deportation order from
twenty years earlier.195
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Asseff, supra note 21, at 174.
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Fernandez-Vargas resolved a split in the circuit courts as to whether
Congress had intended section 241(a)(5) to apply to aliens who reentered
the country prior to IIRIRA’s effective date.196 Once again, the Court used
the Landgraf test and, under the first prong, began by determining whether
Congress had addressed the provision’s reach.197 However, unlike in St.
Cyr, the Court emphasized not the need for clear statements of intent, but
rather the proposition that “normal rules of construction” may be used in an
attempt to “draw a comparably firm conclusion about the temporal reach [of
a law]” in the absence of explicit language from Congress.198
Despite the absence of any statutory language delineating its temporal
reach in relation to IIRIRA’s effective date, the Court found that Congress
had likely intended that section 241(a)(5) should continue to be
retroactively applied.199
The Court found Fernandez-Vargas’s arguments about the omission of
explicit retroactive language unpersuasive, explained that such a reading
would lead to an absurd result,200 and ultimately ruled that “[c]ommon
principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application
of § 241(a)(5) to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of
return.”201 Accordingly, the decision abrogated holdings by those circuits
that had held that section 241(a)(5) could never be retroactively applied.202
The Court then turned to the second prong of the Landgraf test to
determine whether the section amended by IIRIRA would effectively alter
the rights, liabilities, or duties of a party after the fact.203 The Court
focused on the fact that Fernandez-Vargas did not apply for any of the
discretionary forms of relief available to him prior to the effective date of
IIRIRA.204
The Court determined that Fernandez-Vargas’s lack of action was fatal to
his claim that the statute had retroactive effects under either of the
traditional categories. First, the right to apply for such discretionary relief
was not a “vested right” (the first of Justice Story’s categories).205
Fernandez-Vargas claimed that the application of section 241(a)(5)
deprived him of potential avenues of relief that would have been previously
available to him, such as cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and
voluntary departure.206 However, because he had not actually applied for
196. Id. at 36.
197. Id. at 37.
198. Id. (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)).
199. Id. at 38.
200. Id. at 40 (“[I]t would make no sense to infer that Congress meant to except the broad
class of persons who had departed before the time of enactment but who might return
illegally at some point in the future.”).
201. Id. at 41–42.
202. See Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Fernandez-Vargas,
548 U.S. 30; Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated by FernandezVargas, 548 U.S. 30.
203. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 44.
204. Id. at 44 n.10.
205. Id. at 44.
206. Id.
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such relief, the Court described his perceived losses as “inchoate
expectations and unrealized opportunities,” which on their own occupied
nothing higher than the “level of hope.”207
In St. Cyr, the Court had been convinced that the petitioning immigrant
had an expectation of relief that was subsequently taken away. However, in
that case the Court was able to point to more concrete evidence of both St.
Cyr’s knowledge of the relief at stake and the action he took in reliance on
that expectation of relief.208 In contrast, the Court found that the relief
Fernandez-Vargas sought had always been far less guaranteed and far less
expected. Furthermore, Fernandez-Vargas’s opportunity to receive relief
was contingent on him taking affirmative steps to realize it, and he had not
taken any action comparable to St. Cyr’s acceptance of a plea deal.209 As
such, the Court held that the mere potential for relief was not a vested
right.210
Second, because Fernandez-Vargas had not been deprived of a vested
right, the Court looked to whether application of the statute “create[d] a
new obligation, impose[d] a new duty, or attache[d] a new disability, in
respect to transactions or considerations already past.”211 Importantly, the
Court did not consider Fernandez-Vargas’s reentry into the United States as
a past “transaction[] or consideration[]” to which IIRIRA attached new
disabilities.212 Because Fernandez-Vargas had not taken any action (such
as applying to adjust his legal status) prior to IIRIRA’s date of enactment,
the “transaction[] or consideration[]” to be considered was merely his
continued presence in the country.213
It is therefore the alien’s choice to continue his illegal presence, after
illegal reentry and after the effective date of the new law, that subjects
him to the new and less generous legal regime, not a past act that he is
helpless to undo up to the moment the Government finds him out.214

By considering an alien’s continued presence, and not his or her reentry
into the United States, the conduct that triggered the application of
IIRIRA’s reinstatement provisions, the Court allowed the provisions to be
applied to the entire class of aliens who illegally reentered prior to IIRIRA

207. Id.
208. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322–23 (2001) (“There can be little doubt that, as a
general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are
acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. . . . Given the
frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to . . . IIRIRA,
preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought
by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.”).
209. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 44 n.10.
210. Id. (“These putative claims to relief are not ‘vested rights,’ a term that describes
something more substantial than inchoate expectations and unrealized opportunities.”).
211. Id. at 37 (citing Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814)).
212. Id. at 44.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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but who did not take any action to avail themselves of the discretionary
relief available pre-IIRIRA.215
However, the Court was silent on whether the statute may be
retroactively applied to an alien who illegally reentered prior to the
effective date of IIRIRA and who had applied for an adjustment of status
prior to the effective date of IIRIRA.216
Nevertheless, many of the circuit courts had already considered this
question several years before Fernandez-Vargas was decided, and the
circuits seem to have reached a consensus that would temper the expansion
of IIRIRA’s application seen in the Supreme Court’s ruling.217
D. Cases Involving Pre-IIRIRA Applications for Relief
The First, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all found that where an
alien had reentered the United States, applied for and received a visa, and
then applied for an adjustment of status, section 241(a)(5) could not be
applied retroactively consistent with constitutional principles.218
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found the situation in which an alien applied
for asylum prior to the effective date of IIRIRA to be analogous to the other
circuits’ treatment of adjustment of status cases.219
Before reviewing the cases, it is necessary to explain the procedural
mechanisms they involve. In particular, the cases below examine situations
in which an immigrant has applied for (or failed to apply for) an adjustment
of status. Applying for an adjustment of status is a multistep process.220
Prior to applying for the adjustment of status itself, aliens must first
establish a basis for immigration and file a petition for a visa, or—more
often—have a petition filed on their behalf by a sponsor.221 Immigrant
petitions can be filed on the basis of the relation to a citizen or lawful
permanent resident, through employment, humanitarian programs, as well
as for a few other special classes of immigrants.222 The majority of the
cases discussed below involve situations in which an alien’s family member
or spouse filed an immigrant relative visa petition. If a petition is approved,
the alien must then wait for a visa to become available, at which point he or
she will then be prima facie eligible for an adjustment of status.223 After

215. Id. at 47.
216. Id. at 36 n.5.
217. See infra Part IV.D–E.
218. Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); Faiz-Mohammad v.
Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005); Sarmiento Cisneros v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 381 F.3d
1277 (11th Cir. 2004); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).
219. Ixcot v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2011).
220. Adjustment of Status, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-andprocedures/adjustment-status (last updated Mar. 30, 2011).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Silva Rosa v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 403, 406–07 (5th Cir. 2007).
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the alien then applies for adjustment of status, the Attorney General decides
whether or not to grant the request.224
1. Arevalo v. Ashcroft
The First Circuit was the first appellate court to deal with the situation in
which an alien who was deported subsequently reentered the country and
filed for an adjustment of status prior to the effective date of IIRIRA. The
First Circuit reached its decision three years prior to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Fernandez-Vargas.
In Arevalo v. Ashcroft,225 the petitioner illegally reentered the United
States in 1990, after which she successfully received an employment
authorization card (known as a green card).226 In 1996, she applied for an
adjustment of status to become a legal permanent resident.227 Arevalo’s
adjustment of status application was summarily denied and, pursuant to the
changes implemented under IIRIRA, the previous order of deportation was
reinstated without the opportunity for a hearing before an immigration
judge or the opportunity to apply for discretionary relief.228
After applying the first prong of the Landgraf test and determining that
“Congress failed to specify the temporal reach of the INA’s reinstatement
provision,”229 the court examined whether section 241(a)(5) had
impermissibly retroactive effects.230 The court first determined that
Arevalo was not challenging the right to a new deportation hearing, which
had been available prior to IIRIRA, and held that, at any rate, such a right
was subject to retroactive revocation because it was merely procedural—
i.e., there is no right in a particular forum or to a particular mode of
relief.231 However, the First Circuit found that Arevalo’s overarching right
to seek relief at all was a “substantive right.”232
The court then expressed a number of points in dicta that would prove
important in subsequent decisions. First, the court emphasized the
importance of Arevalo’s action in filing for relief prior to IIRIRA’s
effective date.233 The court reasoned that because she had filed prior to the
Act, retroactively disregarding her application pursuant to IIRIRA’s
amendments to the INA would be unfair because it (1) “would deprive her
both of a right that she once had,” and (2) would deprive her of “the
224. Id. at 407.
225. 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).
226. Id. at 6.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 13. Because Arevalo was pre-Fernandez-Vargas, the First Circuit had to
consider both prongs of the Landgraf test.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 14. In making this determination the court relied on prior case law from the
First Circuit as well as, by analogy, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hughes Aircraft, “stating
that changes in whether a claim may be brought at all affect substantive rights.” Id. (citing
Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997)).
233. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15.
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reasonable expectation that she would have the opportunity to convince the
Attorney General to grant her relief.”234
In other words, the First Circuit found that the alien’s claims fell within
the first of Justice Story’s categories of retroactivity involving the
cancellation of vested rights,235 as opposed to the second category (new
cancellation of vested rights), which occupied most of the Court’s analysis
in Fernandez-Vargas.236
The Arevalo court made clear that it found “[the] right to seek relief [to
be] analytically separate and distinct from [the] right to the relief itself.”237
Accordingly, the court held that it was immaterial that the type of relief that
Arevalo sought (an adjustment of status) was a discretionary form of
relief.238 Here, the Arevalo court drew on the Supreme Court’s decision in
St. Cyr.239 Specifically, the Arevalo court cited St. Cyr’s assertion that
“there is a clear difference . . . between facing possible deportation and
facing certain deportation.”240 As such, Arevalo’s right to discretionary
relief had vested upon her application for adjustment of status.241
In the years following Arevalo, the circuit courts that confronted the
same question would largely replicate and cite to the reasoning laid out in
Arevalo in making their own determinations. They also followed and
heavily cited the logic and holding from St. Cyr, which remained the only
guidepost from the Supreme Court for conducting the Landgraf test until
Fernandez-Vargas.
However, their formulations of why IIRIRA’s
application was impermissible differ in subtle ways.
2. Sarmiento Cisneros v. U.S. Attorney General
The Eleventh Circuit was the next circuit to address the retroactivity of
section 241(a)(5) in Sarmiento Cisneros v. U.S. Attorney General,242 and
following Arevalo’s rationale, the court ultimately reached the same
conclusion. Jose Angel Sarmiento Cisneros illegally reentered the United
States, married a U.S. citizen, received a visa (based on a spousal petition
filed by his wife), and applied for and received an adjustment of status prior
to the effective date of IIRIRA.243 The court found that, were the statute to
bar the application, it would have an impermissibly retroactive effect as
applied to Sarmiento; however, interestingly, the court chose to couch the
unfair retroactive effect of the statute not in terms of impairing a vested
right (as in Arevalo), but rather as the attachment of a “new disability to a
completed transaction.”244
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44 n.10 (2006).
Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15.
Id.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001).
Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325).
Id.
381 F.3d 1277, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1284.
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Like the First Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit drew on the “possible
deportation” versus “certain deportation” language from St. Cyr,245 as well
as the First Circuit’s statement that “applications for discretionary relief,
once made, often become a source of expectation and even reliance.”246
However, rather than concluding that the reliance and expectations created
when an alien applies for adjustment of status vest a substantive right, the
court reasoned that the deprivation of that wholly discretionary relief is a
new disability that attaches to the past conduct of those applying for it.247
In other words, the First Circuit considered the pre-IIRIRA application
for adjustment of status to constitute a vested right and applying IIRIRA
would impermissibly destroy that right; the Eleventh Circuit considered the
pre-IIRIRA application for adjustment of status to constitute a past
transaction and applying IIRIRA would impermissibly attach new
disabilities to that past transaction.
3. Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft
Khalid Faiz-Mohammad was another alien who illegally reentered,
married a U.S. citizen, and filed a petition for alien relative, as well as an
application for adjustment of status, prior to IIRIRA’s effective date. In
Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft,248 the Seventh Circuit found the language of
both Arevalo and Sarmiento Cisneros compelling, and further conflated (or
integrated, depending on one’s perspective) Justice Story’s two categories
as it reasoned that IIRIRA’s application was impermissibly retroactive. The
court held that preventing aliens from applying for discretionary relief was
a “‘new disability’ that did not exist prior to IIRIRA’s passage”
(implicating the second category of retroactivity) and that “[c]onsequently,
because § 1231(a)(5) operates to ‘impair rights [Faiz-Mohammad]
possessed when he acted,’ namely his ability to apply for discretionary
relief, § 1231(a)(5) may not be applied retroactively to Mr. FaizMohammad” (implicating the first category of retroactivity).249
4. Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales
The Tenth Circuit was the first to confront the issue post-FernandezVargas, and interestingly, the court did not find the Supreme Court’s ruling
to be an impediment to ruling in favor of the foreign national. In 2007, the
Tenth Circuit decided Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales,250 and the opinion in
the case summarized Faiz-Mohammad, Arevalo, and Sarmiento Cisneros in
the lead up to the court’s decision.251

245. Id.
246. Id. at 1285 (quoting Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15).
247. Id.
248. Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2005).
249. Id. at 810 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (alteration
in original)).
250. Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
251. Id. at 1089–91.
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The Tenth Circuit chose to frame its decision in terms of the second of
Justice Story’s categories.252 The court found that IIRIRA eliminated the
possibility of relief previously available and, as such, a new disability
“attached to a completed transaction because Petitioner had applied for
relief prior to IIRIRA’s enactment.”253 The Tenth Circuit had little trouble
distinguishing the case from Fernandez-Vargas, because the petitioner in
Valdez-Sanchez had applied for and received an adjustment of status prior
to IIRIRA’s effective date, taking the precise steps that the Supreme Court
had noted might have changed the equation in Fernandez-Vargas’s case.254
5. Ixcot v. Holder
In Ixcot v. Holder,255 the Ninth Circuit also addressed the situation in
which an alien who had been subject to a final deportation order illegally
reentered the United States and applied for a form of relief prior to the
effective date of IIRIRA.256 The only difference between Ixcot and the
cases described above is that the alien applied for asylum rather than
adjustment of status.257
In assessing Ixcot’s claims for retroactivity, the Ninth Circuit started by
looking at Fernandez-Vargas, emphasizing the Court’s focus on the fact
that Fernandez-Vargas had not applied for any relief prior to IIRIRA’s
effective date and looking to the Court’s dicta about what FernandezVargas might have done.258 Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had
left open the question of whether having applied for relief before IIRIRA
made its application impermissibly retroactive, the Ninth Circuit then
looked to the history of cases in the other circuits.
Relying on Arevalo, Sarmiento-Cisneros, Faiz-Mohammed, and ValdezSanchez,259 the court concluded that “the most salient fact . . . is whether an
alien filed for relief before IIRIRA’s effective date and was awaiting the
adjudication of that pending application when the government sought to
reinstate an order of deportation under IIRIRA’s reinstatement
provision.”260 The Ninth Circuit held that
[the] difference [between an application for asylum and one for
adjustment of status] is immaterial, because the central inquiry under
Landgraf and St. Cyr is not the particular form of relief sought, nor
whether that form of relief is discretionary, but whether the application of
252. Id. at 1090–91.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1089.
255. 646 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011).
256. Id. at 1203–05.
257. Id. at 1204.
258. Id. at 1209–10; see Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 46 (2006)
(“[Fernandez-Vargas] could have married the mother of his son and applied for adjustment
of status during that period, in which case he would at least have had a claim (about which
we express no opinion) that proven reliance on the old law should be honored by applying
the presumption against retroactivity.”).
259. Ixcot, 646 F.3d at 1210–12.
260. Id. at 1212.
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a new statute “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed.”261

It is difficult to determine whether the Ninth Circuit considered IIRIRA’s
application to be impermissible under the first, second, or both of Justice
Story’s categories of retroactivity, because the court was never explicit in
exactly what it considered to be happening in Ixcot’s case.
The court merely stated that “IIRIRA’s new reinstatement provision
dramatically expanded the scope of reinstatement while simultaneously
barring individuals subject to reinstatement from virtually every form of
immigration relief,” and that therefore because Ixcot had applied for asylum
prior to the statute’s enactment, it could not be retroactively applied to
him.262
The language seems to suggest that both categories are applicable.
Because IIRIRA’s expanded reinstatement provision subjected the asylum
seeker to deportation proceedings, which he would not have been subjected
to prior to the law’s enactment,263 the court seemed to indicate that IIRIRA
attached a new disability (the second category) to his conduct of applying
for asylum. But the other effect of IIRIRA was to “simultaneously bar[]
[him] from virtually every form of immigration relief,” which sounds more
like being denied a right to discretionary relief that vested when he applied
for asylum.264
E. Cases Lacking Pre-IIRIRA Applications for Relief
Although a number of circuits have not ruled on the precise question of
whether IIRIRA can be read retroactively in cases of illegal reentry, most
circuits have ruled on the retroactivity of IIRIRA in one context or another,
and those cases support a growing consensus that conduct short of applying
for discretionary relief before the statute’s effective date will not prevent it
from being retroactively applied.265 Nevertheless, because they are not
directly on point, they require a more abridged analysis than the cases
discussed in the previous section.
Several of the circuits have addressed the situation in which an
immigrant had reentered the United States and then married a U.S. citizen
or legal resident prior to IIRIRA’s effective date. Both the Second and
Fourth Circuits held that IIRIRA could be applied in this situation,
reasoning that marriage did not constitute the kind of past conduct to which
to legal consequences would attach post-IIRIRA.266
261. Id. at 1213 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1210.
264. Id. at 1213.
265. See supra Part IV.D–E.
266. Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that having
married a U.S. citizen without having also applied for an adjustment of status was not
enough to constitute “prior, completed conduct” that would prejudice the alien if section
241(a)(5) was applied); Velasquez-Gabriel v. Crocetti, 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001)
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In 2002, the Eighth Circuit initially held that IIRIRA could not be applied
in this situation, as the elimination of the ability to apply for relief
constituted a new legal consequence to events completed prior to its
enactment.267 However, the decision did not focus on the alien’s marriage
as the past conduct, and in fact did not clarify which past conduct the new
consequence was attaching to. The court merely noted that section
241(a)(5)’s denial of the right to apply for relief constituted the “elimination
of a substantive defense,” which was per se a new legal consequence.268
However, when confronted with the same situation four years later, the
court held that Fernandez-Vargas had overruled the reasoning in AlvarezPortillo v. Ashcroft and therefore found that section 241(a)(5) was not
impermissibly retroactive.269
In Silva Rosa v. Gonzales,270 the alien had not only illegally reentered the
United States and married a permanent resident pre-IIRIRA, but his wife
had also filed an immigrant relative visa petition on his behalf.271 The visa
was approved but not yet available to him prior to IIRIRA’s effective
date.272 Silva Rosa’s visa became available post-IIRIRA, and he was then
able to file for an adjustment of status.273 However, because he was not
able to take the last step of applying for an adjustment of status prior to
IIRIRA, his claim of impermissible retroactivity failed. The court ruled that
the combination of his marriage to a permanent resident and an unapproved
immigrant relative visa petition was not enough to constitute a “vested
right” or “settled expectation.”274 Noting that other circuits had deemed the
application for an adjustment of status as a “completed transaction,” the
court held that the steps Silva Rosa took fell short of what was required.275
Accordingly, because Silva Rosa came after Fernandez-Vargas, the Fifth
Circuit was compelled to find that lacking such a completed transaction,
“IIRIRA does not impermissibly attach new consequences to . . . an illegal
reentry.”276
In Lopez-Flores v. Department of Homeland Security,277 the Eight
Circuit heard the petition of an alien who had also reentered the United
States and applied for a visa prior to IIRIRA.278 However, Lopez-Flores
had applied for an Alien Employment Certification through his sponsoring

(concluding that failure to apply to adjust resident status before the new law took effect
ensured that the statute “attache[d] [no] new legal consequences to events completed before
its enactment” (citation omitted)).
267. Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002).
268. Id.
269. Gonzalez v. Chertoff, 454 F.3d 813, 814–18 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2006).
270. 490 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007).
271. Id. at 405.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 406.
275. Id. at 408.
276. Id. at 409.
277. 387 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2004).
278. Id. at 775.
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employer rather than for an immigrant relative visa petition.279 LopezFlores’s application was not approved until after IIRIRA, and in 2002 he
applied for adjustment of status, which was subsequently denied.280
Following the rationale in Alvarez-Portillo, the court ruled that section
241(a)(5) was impermissibly retroactive as applied to the alien.281
Although the Supreme Court did not discuss Lopez-Flores in its decision in
Fernandez-Vargas, the Tenth Circuit had distinguished the case in its
opinion in the Fernandez-Vargas case, which the Supreme Court
affirmed.282
How should we reconcile the Court’s decision in Fernandez-Vargas283
with the circuit courts’ decisions284 narrowly interpreting the reach of
IIRIRA’s illegal reentry provision? And putting aside Fernandez-Vargas’s
contrary holding, how should we understand the Court’s increasingly
nondeferential stance in immigration?285 The last part of this Note attempts
to reconcile these seemingly contradictory decisions on the retroactivity of
section 241(a)(5) and the contours of the Court’s more recent rulings in
general.
V. IIRIRA’S RETROACTIVE ANALYSIS REFLECTS
THE NORMALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW
A review of the cases presented above leads to two different
observations. The first has to do with the different outcomes seen in
Fernandez-Vargas and the circuit court decisions. The second, and more
important, deals with the kind of analyses employed in the retroactivity
cases as a whole, and how they compare to the broader arc of judicial
review in immigration cases. Part V takes each of these observations in
turn and then concludes by explaining why they matter.
A. Fernandez-Vargas Versus the Circuits
Upon first glance, the picture that emerges from the courts’ treatment of
IIRIRA’s retroactivity is one in which the circuits have tempered the
broader application of the immigration statute as applied in FernandezVargas.286 Under Fernandez-Vargas, immigrants who reentered the
country prior to IIRIRA are still subjected to its harsher immigration
regime, but under the circuit court decisions those who applied for an
adjustment of status before the law went into effect remain entitled to the
relief provided by the more forgiving system that predated it.

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 890 n.11 (10th Cir. 2005), aff’d sub
nom. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006).
283. See supra Part IV.C.
284. See supra Part IV.D–E.
285. See supra Part II.
286. See supra Part IV.D–E.
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This result may seem absurd, but it is not necessarily the product of a
conflict between the Supreme Court and the circuits. In Fernandez-Vargas,
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the existence of many of the
circuit cases discussed above and provided no indication that those
decisions were wrongly decided.287 Nor can the cases properly be
considered a reaction to Fernandez-Vargas, as many of them took place
several years before it.288
However, the mere fact that Fernandez-Vargas left open the question
decided by the circuit cases, does not equate to an outright approval of the
circuits’ decisions in those cases. The Supreme Court could still find that
section 241(a)(5) retroactively applies to aliens who applied for an
adjustment of status prior to IIRIRA’s effective date, and indeed the spirit
of the Court’s decision in Fernandez-Vargas may well support such a
holding.
Furthermore, the Court’s recognition of the circuits’ decisions on that
question might indicate that the Court knew that its decision in FernandezVargas would be limited by the circuits’ interpretations. The Court may
have been more willing to expand the reach of IIRIRA because it knew that
the expansion would still be limited to situations in which aliens had not
taken significant affirmative steps to change their legal status before the
statute went into effect.289
On the other hand, if the result still seems half-baked, one answer may be
just that the Court got it wrong. The Court could have used FernandezVargas as an opportunity to interpret the scope of IIRIRA much more
narrowly. At either step of the Landgraf test, the Court could have found
that the statute should not be retroactively applied, and in fact the way in
which the Court applied the test seems at odds with the Court’s other
decision on IIRIRA’s retroactivity in St. Cyr.
The Court framed the inquiry of determining Congress’s intent with
regard to the provisions of IIRIRA very differently in Fernandez-Vargas
than it did in St. Cyr. In St. Cyr, the Court stressed the demanding nature of
the inquiry and the need for clear statutory language.290 Finding the section
to be ambiguous, the St. Cyr Court invoked the “longstanding principle of
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien,” to support their finding that Congress had not addressed the scope of
the statute.291
In contrast to St. Cyr, in Fernandez-Vargas, the Court emphasized the
use of ordinary tools of statutory interpretation during the first prong of the
Landgraf test to determine congressional intent in the absence of a clear
287. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 n.5, 46 (2006).
288. See Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005); Sarmiento Cisneros
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 381 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2004); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2003).
289. See supra Part IV.C.
290. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316–17 (2001) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.
320, 328 & n.4 (1997)).
291. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449
(1987)).
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statement.292 Additionally, unlike in St. Cyr, the Court did not invoke any
rules that would have favored the petitioning alien, and they found the tools
of interpretation that he used to be uncompelling.293 In particular,
Fernandez-Vargas had cited the statutory interpretive rule of negative
implication, arguing that the removal of language applying the
reinstatement provision to immigrants who reentered prior to the statute’s
effective date was evidence of congressional intent to change the law.294
Critics note that as it dismissed Fernandez-Vargas’s arguments, the Court
did not consider the legislative history of the provision in which Congress
had considered and rejected an earlier draft of the statute that would have
expressly called for the retroactive application of the provisions in section
241(a)(5).295 Additionally, the presence of clear statements of retroactive
reach elsewhere in IIRIRA and a look at the legislative intent behind the
pre-IIRIRA version of the statute also suggest that Fernandez-Vargas’s
interpretation might have more accurately reflected the law’s intended
scope.296
Commentators also have been critical of the Court’s application of the
second prong of Landgraf.297 The Court could have found that the situation
in Fernandez-Vargas was analogous to that in St. Cyr; indeed that was the
argument made by Fernandez-Vargas.298 He argued that just as St. Cyr
might not have taken the plea bargain in the absence of the relief eliminated
by IIRIRA, so might he not have reentered and continued to live in the
United States if it were not for the availability of discretionary relief that
existed pre-IIRIRA.299
The Court instead chose to shift the triggering conduct from FernandezVargas’s reentry to his presence in the country, allowing the Court to
bypass the retroactive effects of the statute by finding that it was the alien’s
failure to leave the country that subjected him to the new law’s stricter
consequences.300 Arguably, this leads to the somewhat absurd result of
arguing that an alien can escape the harsh reinstatement of removal to a
country by moving there voluntarily.301
Ultimately, there are no clear answers about what motivated the Court’s
decision in Fernandez-Vargas or why the circuits have reached the
consensus seen in their cases. Undoubtedly the differing results of these
cases are in large part attributable to the abstruse standards laid out by the

292. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 37 (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326).
293. Id. at 40.
294. Id. at 38.
295. See, e.g., Asseff, supra note 21, at 166.
296. Id. at 167.
297. Id. at 168.
298. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 40.
299. Id. at 39.
300. See Asseff, supra note 21, at 21.
301. Id. at 170. Fernandez-Vargas sought to avoid having to return to live in Mexico, not
merely to avoid the removal process itself. “It is thus disingenuous for the Court to argue
that Fernandez-Vargas could have improved his situation and avoided the new legal
consequences of the IIRIRA by voluntarily returning to Mexico.” Id.
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Landgraf test and Justice Story’s language. At least one author argues that
the ambiguity seen in the test for retroactivity necessitates the creation of a
rule of lenity favoring noncitizens in immigration law.302
However, the minutiae of the debate over whether Fernandez-Vargas
was correctly decided or why the cases create such a trivial trigger for
determining IIRIRA’s retroactive application tends to obscure a more
important observation about how the courts are interpreting immigration
law in general.
B. IIRIRA’s Retroactivity As Ordinary Statutory Interpretation
The existence of the debate over Fernandez-Vargas itself shows that
when it comes to assessing the retroactivity of section 241(a)(5), both the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts reviewed IIRIRA in an active and
involved manner. Rather than deferring to the government’s interpretation
of IIRIRA or providing overbroad readings of the statute in recognition of
Congress’s plenary power in immigration, all of the courts used common
interpretive tools to carefully apply the Landgraf test to the immigration
statute. Even the somewhat erratic use of Justice Story’s categories and the
myriad arguments against the result in Fernandez-Vargas would seem to
indicate that the courts are actively using the interpretive tools available to
them, allowing them to find multiple paths to define the outer limits of
IIRIRA’s application.
In this way the cases on IIRIRA’s retroactivity are consistent with the
Court’s more thorough review of the statute in general, as illustrated by the
cases in Part III. The picture that emerges from the Court’s treatment of
IIRIRA is one that stands in sharp contrast to the worries espoused by
commentators who feel that the Court has been overly deferential to other
branches in immigration law.303 Far from being reluctant to fulfill its
interpretive role, the Court has continually applied the substantive and
interpretive tools it has in order to push back against the political branches
when it comes to IIRIRA’s harsh changes to immigration law.
One explanation for the more normalized statutory interpretation seen in
the retroactivity cases is that it is merely the result of the Landgraf test’s
formal framework for review. When structured tests or doctrines from
other areas of law are applied to the immigration context, they might offer
the Court greater leverage to examine immigration statutes in a more
ordinary and less deferential way. The use of the Landgraf test in
Fernandez-Vargas might then be comparable to the application of the equal
protection framework discussed in Part II. Applying the test amounted to a
more thorough review of the statute, but ultimately the result of the case
was less immigrant-friendly than might be expected.
Nevertheless, the retroactivity cases’ consistency with the other
nondeferential IIRIRA cases suggests that there is a larger trend toward
reviewing immigration law in a more ordinary manner. At least one
302. Id. at 175.
303. See supra Part II.
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commentator has argued that in the last few years the Court has completely
normalized its treatment of not only the IIRIRA cases but all immigration
cases. Professor Kevin R. Johnson examines the Court’s immigration
decisions from 2009 to 2013 and concludes that the Court has
“mainstreamed U.S. immigration law and slowly but surely moved away
from anything that might be reasonably characterized as ‘immigration
exceptionalism.’”304
Professor Johnson details how the contemporary court has repeatedly
rejected agency interpretations through the use of “standard, unremarkable
[tools of] statutory interpretation.”305 It may then be that when viewed in
the context of the Court’s recent decisions, the IIRIRA line of cases are but
one example of the judiciary’s growing rejection of the long tradition of
deference and exceptionalism in reviewing immigration laws.
C. Why Does It Matter?
While in theory laws are to be interpreted and executed with regard to a
single meaning,306 in practice the three branches of American government
rarely agree on the application of the law.307 The legislators who write and
pass a law hope that it conveys their intent regarding its application (to the
extent that a single opinion can be evinced from a body of hundreds of
legislators).308 The executive agencies that enforce the laws have their own
interpretations of how the laws should be construed in practice, which may
reflect the agencies’ own interests.309 The judiciary attempts to play the
role of “faithful agent” to the legislature,310 but nonetheless may be
influenced and motivated by its own particular institutional and historical
304. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: The Burgeoning
Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 8) (on file with author).
305. Id. at 18.
306. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 492 (2004) (“The judiciary must reject
administrative constructions that are contrary to clear congressional intent. The executive
branch is not permitted to administer a statute in a manner that is inconsistent with the
administrative structure that Congress has enacted in law. Thus, where the intent of
Congress is clear, the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to that intent.”).
307. See Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws:
The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 466
(1987) (“Despite its notable commitment to legal process, the government of the United
States faces inherent difficulties in achieving unitary, government-wide legal interpretation.
The very distribution of power among three coequal branches of government means that
each branch may evolve at least some important understandings of the law that differ from
those of the other two branches.”).
308. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 915 (2013).
309. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 209 (2004) (“[C]ourts and commentators alike have
recognized the possibility that an agency may adopt a statutory or regulatory interpretation
that represents an exercise in agency aggrandizement—that is, an interpretation that
advances the agency’s own interests vis-à-vis the interests of other agencies, other
governmental institutions or private parties.”).
310. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 308, at 912–14.

2014]

IIRIRA’S RETROACTIVITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

987

perspectives,311 leaving it to express rulings that may or may not always be
consistent with the intent or interpretations of the political branches.
Therefore, when reviewing the application of a law, courts are confronted
with a confluence of interests, further complicating the already fraught task
of interpreting statutes that may be unclear, ambiguous, or overreaching.
While courts may choose to ignore (properly or not) the background of
interests and influences as they go about their business, they may yet find
themselves confronting the basic choice of deferring to the interpretations
that have been presented to them, or fashioning their own readings.312
How much deference the courts should give to the other branches when
reviewing their acts and decisions is one of the most fundamental and
endlessly controversial issues in American jurisprudence.313 How that
question is answered has important implications for the balance of power
wielded by the different branches, the constitutional roles of each branch in
governing, and the protection of individual liberties.314
A nondeferential court that strictly polices the actions of the political
branches may be seen as activist, unrepresentative, and frustratingly
countermajoritarian.315 However, when a court is too deferential it may be
311. See Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 153, 197–98 (2013) (arguing that the rise of scientific public opinion polling provided the
Court with a new source of legitimacy and that subsequently “[t]he Court’s sociological
legitimacy became its guiding star”); Richard Lavoie, Activist or Automaton: The
Institutional Need to Reach a Middle Ground in American Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV.
611, 618–19 (2005) (asserting that “a middle ground, where the judiciary is allowed some
degree of lawmaking authority, but is also subject to constraints on the exercise of this
authority, represents the best overall solution from an institutional perspective”).
312. Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 221, 231–32 (2013) (“[L]egal realists recognized that the notion of
‘legislative intent’ is often a fiction and that courts necessarily exercise substantial policymaking discretion when they decide cases pursuant to traditional methods of statutory
interpretation.”); see also Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1061, 1090 (2008) (examining when and why courts defer).
313. See Horwitz, supra note 312, at 1069 (“[D]eference has featured in countless
discussions in the academic literature of constitutional law and its cousin, administrative
law.”); see also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency
Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623 (2006) (examining the debate over Chevron
and deference to the executive branch when public values are implicated); Michael P. Healy,
Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the
Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (delineating the areas of
judicial review that “remain unsolved” following Chevron); Kevin R. Johnson, supra note
304, at 9 (“A common battleground for advocates, and differences of opinion among the
Justices, is the deference properly afforded the Board of Immigration Appeals, with the
arguments mirroring the general ones surrounding propriety of deference to the work of
administrative agencies.”). A recent study of Chevron deference cites at least 115 cases that
attempt to make sense of when and how courts should defer under that doctrine. Kristine C.
Karnezis, Construction and Application of “Chevron Deference” to Administrative Action
by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 2D 25 (2005). A Westlaw KeyCite search
conducted April 2, 2014 yielded 9334 law review articles that have cited Chevron itself.
314. See generally Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional
Decision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 472 (2013) (discussing the implications of deference
in “Legislative, Administrative, and ‘Special’ Contexts”).
315. See Legomsky, supra note 48, at 1628 (“[U]nelected, relatively unaccountable
federal judges make decisions that can profoundly affect the political life of the nation. The
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viewed as failing to fulfill its role in protecting constitutional rights from
overreaches by the political branches and neglecting to play a more active
part in protecting those groups which are vulnerable due to their lack of
representation and political power.316
Immigration law often has been considered to be an area in which the
courts have been very deferential both to the executive branch (in the form
of administrative agencies), to Congress, and even to state legislatures.317
In some sense this may not be so surprising. Immigration is a field in
which Congress and the executive branch have traditionally held plenary
power.318 Residence and citizenship can confer substantial rights and
privileges, and therefore, the granting of these statuses should arguably be
in the hands of the representative branches.319 Additionally, the sheer
volume of immigrants, and the complexity of structures in place to handle
immigration, may make it an area in which courts are ill-equipped to make
decisions.320
Nevertheless, the dangers of an overly deferential court are keenly felt in
the immigration sphere.321 Immigrants, especially those who have entered
the country illegally, are perhaps the group with the least ability to navigate
the social and political systems in place to obtain political representation

broader the impact of those decisions, the more concern there is about leaving the last word
to a body or a person not subject to a political check.”).
316. See generally Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative
Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2031 (2011)
(discussing the lack of protections for individual rights when courts give agencies undue
deference).
317. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
1 (1984) (“Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and
divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure,
and judicial role that animate the rest of our legal system.”). See generally Anne Y. Lee, The
Unfettered Executive: Is There an Inherent Presidential Power to Exclude Aliens?, 39
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223 (2005) (examining theories of executive power in
immigration law).
318. See Brian G. Slocum, Courts vs. the Political Branches: Immigration “Reform” and
the Battle for the Future of Immigration Law, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 511 (2007)
(“Under the infamous ‘plenary power’ doctrine, created by the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth century, courts have traditionally considered the power of Congress over
immigration to be nearly unlimited and the constitutional rights of immigrants to be almost
nonexistent.”); see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune
from judicial control.”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
319. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
320. See Legomsky, supra note 48, at 1629 (“When a court reverses a decision of an
administrative agency, a body that lacks specialized expertise in the particular field is
superseding a body that has such expertise. In immigration law, where technical nuances
abound, the value of expertise should not be discounted.”).
321. See Rana, supra note 41, at 345. In many ways, the “history of immigration
jurisprudence is a history of obsession with judicial deference” and one that continues, and
appears to be deepening, today. Id. at 343 (quoting Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation,
and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1671 (2007)).

2014]

IIRIRA’S RETROACTIVITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

989

and secure their rights.322 Moreover, immigration has always been a highly
politically charged matter, and unfortunately, xenophobia has long been a
potent force in American politics, especially during times in which jobs and
resources are scarce.323 Therefore, there is arguably a special need for the
judiciary, which is, at least in theory, more removed from the political
sphere, to play an active role in reviewing the actions of the other
branches.324
The need for a more vigilant judiciary is heightened by the political
branches’ contemporary efforts to curb the courts’ role in immigration.325
In 1996, IIRIRA drastically changed the “substance and structure of
immigration law and proceedings . . . mak[ing] it [much] more difficult for
noncitizens to obtain and keep legal status in the United States.”326 The
years since IIRIRA’s passage are one of the “longest periods of time that
have passed without significant immigration reform since the 1880s.”327
The anti-immigrant nature of IIRIRA and the lack of meaningful reform
since its passage, exaggerate the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the statute’s scope. It is perhaps heartening then to see
that in interpreting IIRIRA, the courts have shied away from the old trends
of deference and used the statutory tools at their disposal to engage in the
meaningful review of a law that can have such a profound impact on the
lives of so many immigrants.
CONCLUSION
Nearly twenty years after its passage, the Court continues to grapple with
the scope of IIRIRA. More surprising still is that among the biggest

322. See Legomsky, supra note 48, at 1631 (“[I]mmigrants . . . lack access to the normal
political channels on which United States citizens can rely for some measure of
protection.”).
323. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform
After “9/11?,” 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 317–22 (2003) (describing the history of
racial exclusion in U.S. immigration policy).
324. See Legomsky, supra note 48, at 1631 (“Immigrants must depend on a fair and
impartial judiciary because they have no one else on whom they can rely.”); see also Rana,
supra note 41, at 345 (“[P]erhaps more than in other areas of administrative law, the
political, human rights, and national security issues at stake in immigration cases often
underscore the potentially high stakes involved in the debates over the nature of the judicial
role. It is not surprising, then, that deference issues have long been of heightened
significance in the immigration context.”).
325. Slocum, supra note 318, at 510 (“Congress’s efforts at reform have been mostly
anti-immigrant in nature, including particularly troubling attempts to divest courts of
jurisdiction to review many challenges to deportation. In turn, the executive branch’s
reforms have included attempts to undermine the independence of administrative
adjudicators and to expedite the administrative review process by providing for less
administrative review.”).
326. Kate Aschenbrenner, Beyond “Because I Said So”: Reconciling Civil Retroactivity
Analysis in Immigration Cases with a Protective Lenity Principle, 32 REV. LITIG. 147, 169
(2013).
327. Adriane Meneses, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and
Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing
Deportation As Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 785 (2012).
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questions presented by the law is when it can be applied to immigrants
whose actions predate it.
However, the decisions on the retroactivity of IIRIRA speak to more than
just the individual actions of those caught up in its provisions; they are part
of a broader discussion of the judiciary’s role in immigration and the
courts’ responses to the political branches’ attempts to circumscribe the
already limited judicial intervention available in immigration cases. This
Note adds to that broader understanding by examining one line of cases that
show how the modern courts have chaffed at their historically deferential
role in immigration law and pushed back at the strict legal regimes created
by Congress and the broad interpretations of restrictive immigration laws
advocated for by immigration agencies. While the normalization of judicial
review in immigration law does not always mean that the Court’s decisions
will be immigrant-friendly, it does at least mean that the laws that affect
immigrants will be subjected to the type of searching review that we expect
from our judiciary.

